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Abstract 
The principal objective of the study was to establish the form and extent of linkages between the 
formal and informal segments of the financial market in Uganda. 
The study reveals that some interaction between the formal financial institutions (FFIs,.) and the 
informal financial institutions (IFis) exist in the area of savings mohilisation. Direct credit links 
are less significant, while the intermediaiy role far the informal financial institutions between 
borrowers and the FFIs is very weak and limited. 
Indirect credit link between FFJs and IFIs have elements of both competitiveness and 
coinplementarit with the latter being more predominant. In particular, there is very little 
competition between IFIs and EEls in the delivery of credit. 
Although a wide variety of informal sources are available to meet the needs of different informal 
users, they have limitations. Each of these sources are independent and generally segmented 
from one another. 
The study also reveals that rethrming financially repressive policies is not sufficient to overcome 
fragmentation qf financial markets because of structural and institutional barriers to linkages 
between fbrmai and injbrmalfinancial segments. Uganda has fragmented financial markets with 
weak linkages between thrinal and informal segments. Ditjèrences in costs and risks alone are 
not sufficient to explain the interest rate diffrrentials. 
The study shows that the relatively high transaction, information and enjbrcement costs coupled 
with stringent collateral requirements of/brmal banking institutions make serving small 
businesses and households unattractive. Indeed, these fInancial institutions typically do not 
consider them creditworthy, hut paradoxically enough, private moneylenders do consider them 
creditworthy,fbr advancing loans. Informal sector techniques may have an important role to play 
in serving these such clients. 
Since there are limits to the extent to which FFIs can act like informal lenders, what is 
recommended is that there should be complementary measures to address institutional and 
structural problems to accompany tinancial liberalization and bank restructuring exercise. Such 
measures should also include fbrging direct links between informal and formal financial 
markets, ,for instance, a credit bureau to perform some of the functions of the FFIs. 
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1.0 Introduction 
In Uganda, like most developing countries, the indigenous private sector consists largely of 
households and small-scale enterprises that operate outside the formal financial system. In this 
study we use the term 'informal finance' to refer to the operations of all lawful but unregulated 
entities such as rotating (and non-rotating) saving and credit associations such as the tontines and 
susu in West Africa, money-lenders and money collectors and other providers of retail financial 
services. Its defining characteristic is that it is outside the purview of the legal, fiscal, regulatory 
and prudential framework of the monetary and financial authorities. 
Informal savings activities in Uganda are widespread but generally self-contained and 
isolated from those of formal institutions. There is evidence of demand for external finance by 
enterprises that want to expand beyond the limits of self-finance but have historically lacked 
access to bank credit. 
1.1 Financial depth 
The reform of financial sector in Uganda is part and parcel of the overall Economic Recovely 
Programme (ERP). Monetary policy has become a major cornerstone of overall economic policy 
in Uganda. The subsistence sector, however, limits the growth of the financial sector and 
effectiveness of monetary policy. As would be the case in the economy whose level of 
monetisation is still low, there is a narrow range of monetary and financial instruments that have 
been developed for monetary policy and investment purposes. The Bank of Uganda Bill was 
indeed introduced to meet part of this challenge. 
The financial sector still lacks depth and breadth. Currency in circulation accounts for about 
30 percent of broad money supply, M2, substantially down from about 50 percent in 1987, which 
reflects increased confidence in the banking system. However, this ratio is high compared to say, 
3 percent in the UK. In addition, non-monetary GDP was about 25 percent of GDP in 1996 down 
from 30 percent in 1994. Furthermore, the ratio of nominal GDP to M2 was about 9 percent in 
1995/96. Domestic saving rate of less than 10 percent is very low by international and Sub 
Saharan Africa standards. 
1.2 Monetary situation at the rural level 
While there is an urgent need to nurture financial intermediation and promote savings 
accumulation at the national level, most of our rural level sub-economies are not even 
monetized.' These sub-economies remain first and foremost cash economies. Cash is not 
transformed into bank deposits as often as it should be; instead it stays hoarded by fragmented 
groups of people. There is no way it can be captured and re-injected by the financial 
intermediation system to finance economic development simply because it remains outside of the 
system itself. 
Note and coins (cash) held by individuals circulate in the econmy and are periodically transformed into 
bank deposits, a process called monetization. The word cash refers to the currency in circulation in the 
public domain and not that deposited in banks. Monetization therefore refers to the transformation of 
physical cash into bank deposits. 
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Monetization therefore does not occur at the rural level as often as it should. Banks are 
needed in order for cash to be transformed into deposits; yet they are few, if any, commercial 
bank branches in such areas. 
Furthermore, the few commercial bank branches that operate at the rural level make little 
effort to mobilize cash. They are not incited to do so by the rather difficult geographical and 
economic conditions prevailing at that level. Excess cash cannot be physically transported to the 
next central bank branch or currency centre because this would mean canying it over dozens of 
miles without proper security. 
Cash is kept at the branch level, thereby increasing the banks reluctance to mobilize more 
deposits from its local clients. Mobilizing deposits, in any case, is also costly because the cost 
of maintaining branches in such a hostile environment is high and costs are not offset by revenues 
derived from an otherwise weak and small lending activity. 
Unlike rural areas, small- and medium-sized towns usually have bank branches, yet 
monetization is not optimal in these areas either. For poor urban and pen-urban areas, the 
t,c.cr—j- ,—'il ,-rr, cyfrQi,,f4, rvd 'c'.cl li, c,csr. rd ,'.,l rlQtrrlt 'arid i ilti iil lrrro l',r1 l,-i 1+1 ¼dlJA £tJL £fl..'lti *. .JI flU 11 1411110 ILL %. A %LjAasI.1L t/J fl.J1 1JL1J1 S/ILL S/JL LULl 144.41143 14-LIts 1.4.1±3 S/I. ±1. t4.I;'S1 LW I 
highly diversified, unstable population, banks tend to limit the clientele they work with to narrow 
segments of the surrounding population. Although distances are not a problem in these areas, 
operational costs are as high as they are in rural areas because of the large numbers of loan 
delinquencies. 
It is important to note that this situation in rural and pen-urban areas is not likely to change 
in the next few years. It is more likely to worsen, now that the main commercial bank (UCB) is 
being pnivatized. To restructure the financial sector at the national level, banks are encouraged 
to be more profitable, thus closing more branches at the rural level. Paradoxically, therefore, rural 
economies will become even more liquid in the coming years because of the strengthening of the 
financial systems at the national level. 
This overall situation points, therefore to an interesting aspect of rural economies : they 
cannot extricate themselves from the liquidity trap into which they are plunged; geographical and 
cultural isolation compound the cash problem. While cash flows almost everywhere in these 
areas, it does not actually fuel the ongoing local economies process. Banks cannot play their role 
in deposit mobilization because of difficult geographical and cultural situation in which they 
operate. Assistance from outside contributes to a worsening of the problem since it increases the 
amount of cash trapped in the region without providing a way to transform that cash into bank 
deposits. 
1.2 Credit repression at the rural level 
Due to low level of monetization, credit activities are repressed at the rural level. Repression 
comes from a paradoxical situation where, in a highly liquid environment, bank branches do not 
have enough mobilized cash to loan. 
As a result of the hyper-liquid situation at the rural level, the economic agents who borrow 
have very little possibility of keeping, transferring or simply handling proceeds of any loan in the 
abstract form of a deposit. For a bank at this level, then, there is high probability that any 
borrower will want to transform the proceeds of the loan into cash immediately. 
Pressure to cash the loan quickly will also come from the borrower's business partners since 
none of them is likely to hold a bank account in which to store money in the form of deposit. For 
a bank, therefore, extending credit amounts to putting itself under constant pressure to find cash 
- not a very easy situation if a strong drive to mobilize deposits has not been undertaken long 
beforehand by the bank. 
While it is obvious that the fear of lending to small economic units plays an important role in the 
reluctance of banks to make loans at the rural level, the fear of becoming illiquid if deposits 
created by loans are withdrawn too quickly by borrowers plays a hidden but rather important role 
in shaping a banks attitude vis-a-vis lending. This fear must be taken into account in a significant 
way in understanding and resolving the financial intermediation problems encountered at the rural 
level. 
Credit repression is reinforced by geographical isolation of rural areas from the main centres of 
economic activity. Because cash circulating in the area is not captured by banks, the cash needed 
by banks for daily transactions must be brought physically from great distances and at a cost, thus 
making prompt timely portfolio adjustments at the rural level difficult. 
2.0 Objectives of the study 
Thc rt-, rhti rfth ctii,1, i-n tmter tJ- frrni cirr tytpiit rf lcc htwn th 
formal and informal segments of financial markets in Uganda and to analyse the possible linkages 
in terms of their impact on borrowers and the process of financial intermediation. 
Specific objectives include the following: 
(a) To determine whether informal financial institutions (IFIs) and micro-finance 
institutions (MFIs) bank with formal financial institutions (FFIs); 
(b) To determine whether informal financial institutions and MIFIs borrow funds from 
formal financial institutions for on-lending to their clients; 
(c) To establish whether there is competition or complementarity between the formal 
and informal financial institutions; and 
(d) To suggest policy recommendations based on the study findings. 
3.0 Research hypotheses 
It is hypothesized that: 
(a) IFIs bank with FFIs 
(b) IFIs maintain bank accounts at FFIs to ease payments to their clients; 
(c) IFEs deposit savings at FFIs for safety or security; and 
(d) Informal credit complements rather than substitutes for formal credit. 
4.0 Review of the literature and conceptual framework 
One view emerging from the literature is that while the financial market is extensively 
segmented, demand for credit or saving facilities in one sector cannot always be said to be 
exclusive to that sector. The linkages between the sectors arise out of 'non-specific' demand. 
Many people who would normally use the services of the formal sector, find themselves 
compelled to use the services offered by the informal sector to complement what they have 
received or may receive from the formal sector. 
They also sometimes make a substitution if the price of credit from the informal sector is 
lower, as will be the case in borrowing at near-zero interest from friends. Similarly, 'normal' 
informal savers, may begin saving on the formal circuit if an opportunity for obtaining cheap 
credit comes up by way of a government or NGO-sponsored rural finance project. Here the 
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formal credit substitutes for the expensive informal credit. Element of complementarity may also 
be present in this relation. 
These linkages were observed both in savings mobilization and credit allocation (Aryeetey, 
1992; Hyuha et. al., Kipokola, 1993; Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1992). What is not yet clear is 
how significant these linkages are for the development of the entire financial sector in the 
economy, and therefore the extent to which action taken in one financial sector may have 
repercussion in another. This may partly depend on whether the linkage relationships is 
complementary or competitive. Knowing the effect of this relationship on the financial Sector 
market could assist in directing government policy towards them. 
Direct deposit links (for example, with IFIs depositing funds at FFIs) would help reduce the 
level of idle cash balances at IFIs, while at the same time enhances the capability of commercial 
banks to create money. On the other hand, direct credit links (for example, with credit flowing 
from FFIs to IFIs) would help to relieve the liquidity problem of IFIs (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 
1992). 
Drawing on the experience of rural India, where state agencies, co-operatives and banks 
were established to reduce the influence of money ]enders by competing with them, Bell (1990) 
analyzes how the welfare of the borrower is affected under four different scenarios. The first 
scenario consists of the money lenders operating in the absence of the state agencies; the second 
involves exclusive institutional loans of institutional lender operating in the absence of money 
lenders. The third scenario is of non-exclusive institutional contracts. here, borrowing from the 
informal sector is considered to take place after the borrower has failed to secure formal credit. 
Under this scenario, a spillover of demand from the formal to informal sector of the credit market 
will take place as long as there is rationing in the formal sector at a fixed rate of interest and 
lenders find it profitable to grant credit in the informal sector after screening the borrower. In the 
fourth scenario, it is assumed that money lenders act as intermediaries of formal lenders. Bell 
explains how, in this situation, the cost of funds to the money lender will decline. The impact of 
this on the money lender's clients will depend on whether he is a monopolist or a perfect 
competitor. If he is a perfect competitor, the entire gain from the decline in the rate of interest 
accrues to the borrowers, whereas if he is a monopolist the gain is shared between lender and 
borrowers. This suggests that the presence of the money lender in the credit market does not 
necessarily have a negative impact on the borrower. 
Significant interactions between the formal and informal segments of the financial market 
have been observed in Ghana (Aryeetey, 1992), Malawi (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1992) and 
in India (Bell, 1990). In Malawi the formal sector is found to be the largest depository of financial 
savings and the informal sector, the largest source of credit. In Ghana, a significant amount of 
private-sector savings held by indigenous banks is initially mobilized by the susu collectors. It 
is argued that the linkages in credit allocation have elements of both competition and 
complementarity and to a lesser extent an intermediary role for the informal sector between 
borrowers and the banking system. The authors assert that the linkages between the formal and 
informal systems currently provide no positive benefits for the borrowers and savers, and 
subsequently to the economy as a whole, since they do not encourage local investment. 
Using Bell's scenario of "equilibrium with non-exclusive institutional contracts", Chipeta 
and Mkandawire (1992) provide evidence that credit from formal financial sector sources is 
sought before credit from the informal financial sector. Empirically, this has been observed in 
India (Bell, Srinivasan and Urdy, 1990), in Ghana (Aryeetey, 1992), and in Malawi (Chipeta and 
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Mkandawire, 1992). One reason for approaching these sources was that they were the only ones 
known to borrowers. The other was that credit from these sources was and is still much cheaper 
than credit from money lenders. 
Competitive credit links 
A competitive credit link exits when an increase in borrowing from FFIs is accompanied by 
a reduction in borrowing from IFIs, and vice versa. As an example, this means that an increase 
in capital formation that is financed by FFSs credit substitutes financing that would be undertaken 
by the IFIs (Aryeetey, 1992). In this event, the WI is not a provider of residual financing; it is at 
par with the FFIs. Considered to be an alternative finance, WJs credit thus rises as FFIs credit 
falls. In competitive environment, the opportunities open to borrowers are diverse, hence, they 
are able to improve their welfare by freely negotiating on the two credit markets for the best terms 
and conditions. 
While Aryeetey (1995) found hardly any data on general household indebtedness to both 
formal and informal units to compare trends in Africa, it has become evident from the studies in 
Ghana and M1wi (ArvAetv lQQ thst th dc1in nd rnwth nf infnrm1 credit is little 
influenced by development in formal finance or change in financial sector po1ies. 
The observations from Ghana never supported any notion that the relative size of formal and 
informal finance change with financial sector policies. Neither did Malawian data, which is quite 
opposite of Bell's (1990) observations in India, where there was growth in formal credit 
accompanied by growth in informal credit in many instances. Interestingly, in the more recent 
study by Aryeetey (1994), informal sector is seen to be growing relatively rapidly in the 
prevailing liberal climate faster than formal sector credit. 
Complementary credit link 
When growth in demand for credit from one sector is accompanied by an increase in demand 
for credit from the other sector, then, irrespective of the type of cause, the indirect links are 
complementary (Chipeta and Mkandawire, 1992; Aryeetey, 1992). In essence, what this means 
is that an increase in capital formation that is financed by FFIs credit creates additional productive 
capacity that can be utilized also with IFIs credit. The joint impact on the economy of credits 
from the two sectors will depend on the relative amount of credit from Informal financial sectors 
(IFS) considered to be additional finance in excess of what comes from the formal financial 
sector (FFS). An increase in demand for credit from the IFS is thus seen to be created by 
increasing use of FFS credit. 
The data from Ghana (Aryeetey, 1995) suggests that the significance of informal credit as a 
means of residual financing in this manner is very limited. In practice, only one out of the 26 
enterprises that received only part of the required amount from banks is reported to have used 
credit from informal sources to complete the planned investment expenditure. For Malawi also, 
Chipeta and Mkandawire (1992) observed that amounts borrowed from informal sources did not 
vary directly with credit from formal sources. 
In urban areas where a lot of demand for credit is non-specific, especially considering that 
many people interact freely with both segments, the issue of complementarity and substitution 
is less clear. 
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5.0 Methodology 
The survey was carried out in six districts: Kampala, Masaka, Mbarara, Jinja, Mbale and Lira. 
Four different sets of questionnaire were administered to: Households, NGOs, self-help 
groups (credit and savings associations, women groups, clubs, etc.) and banks. Both qualitative 
and quantitative information were obtained through rapid appraisal techniques involving 
face-to-face interview or by observation or references to record books or files. 
In each selected district, a random sample of about 80 households (selected from both 
urbanlperi-urban and rural areas) were interviewed. In addition, at least fifteen groups, five NGOs 
and all the commercial banks in the area were also covered for each district. 
6.0 Summary of the findings 
6.1 The households survey results 
Borrowing activities 
Of the 498 households interviewed, about 53 percent reported that they usually borrow money 
from individuals, SCAs, NGOs or banks (Table 1). 
Table 1: Sources of borrowed money 







Table 1 shows that 66 percent of the households interviewed borrow from individuals (friends, 
relatives and private money lenders) and/or savings and credit associations. 
Only 37 percent of those who borrowed from individuals were charged some interest while 
the rest were interest free. Some respondents borrowed from more than one individual and each 
individual had his/her own terms of lending. 
About 70 percent of savings and credit associations are ROSCAs. The common bond among 
them is that they either belong to the same community (51 percent) or that they are workmates 
(28 percent). Some respondents belonged to more than one association or group. 
Of those who borrowed from NGOs, 56 percent were required to provide collateral. 
Sometimes the NGOs required more than one form of collateral. 
All 30 households who borrowed from the banks were required to provide land titles as 
collateral. Others also attached assets such as buildings as part of their collateral. 
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Lending activities 
Of the 498 households interviewed, only 19 percent admitted they do lend out money to 
others. The main source of the funds for on-lending is their own income (from salary, trade or 
farming). 60 percent of these money lenders admitted that they could not honour all the loan 
requests the previous year. The collaterals they require vary considerably, from postdated cheques 
to real estates. 
The penalties for default also vary from one individual to another. 38 percent of the lenders 
simply stopped lending to the defaulters! 
6.2 Financial infrastructure 
The financial infrastructure in Uganda is composed of two main segments - formal and 
informal. 
(a) The formal financial institutions 
Like in most of Stih-Shran Africa, the formal financial system in Uganda is underdeveloped, 
small and undiversified in terms of value and volume of transactions. The system consists of the 
Central Bank (Bank of Uganda), 20 commercial banks, 6 non-bank credit institutions, 3 
development finance institutions2, 26 insurance companies, one building society, one cooperative 
savings and credit union, one leasing company, 76 forex bureaus deal in buying and selling of 
foreign exchange and the National Social Security Fund. In addition, there is one Postal Savings 
bank. 
Commercial banks dominate the sector accounting for over 90% of its assets. They have a 
network of 155 branches and 45 agencies. This, however, is considerably lower than the 290 
branches in 1970. In addition, there has been a decline in the ratio of persons per branch from 
34,000 in 1972 to 100,000 persons per branch in 1996 (Bank of Uganda). 
Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB) is the largest commercial bank in the country. Until 
recently, it accounted for over 60% of the market and had an extensive branch network 
countrywide3. UCB also account for 31% of the deposits in the system, and the four 
foreign-owned banks account for only 38% while the remaining 31% is shared among the 
indigenous banks. 
Government has recently sold off its 49 percent shares in UCB to a Malaysian investor as part 
of privatization. UCB has been down-sized and restructured, with more than half of its branches 
closed and one fifth of the staff retrenched. 
The formal banking sector is no where to be found in many isolated rural areas. The sector 
is concentrated in the capital and in main urban centres, leaving the poor remote areas with a 
highly liquid economy. 
A special situation has thus developed with regard to financial intermediation at the micro 
level: intermediation functions are now also performed by institutions that do not belong to the 
financial sector. Policies and concepts that were designed to deal with a homogeneous set of 
2 
These are the East African Development Bank (EADB), Uganda Developement Bank (UDB) and the 
Development Finance Company of Uganda (DFCU). 
Out of the entire network UCB has 84 branches and 42 agencies. 
7 
financial institutions are now implemented in a fuzzy context where a heterogeneous set of 
banking and non-banking institutions operate. The fact that non-banking intermediation at the 
micro level does not appear in the macro-level picture should not be misinterpreted: ultimately, 
the financial-sector intermediation activity at the macro level is completely dependent upon the 
intermediation at the micro level (that is, the non-bank intermediation), if only because macro 
levels are merely aggregates of the micro levels. 
To embody this complex reality, the set of institutions that perform financial intermediation 
is often designated by the term 'financial infrastructure' - formal and informal financial 
intermediaries. The informal financial intermediaries operating are: 
(b) the informal financial intermediaries 
NGOs; 
self-help groups, for example, savings and credit associations, clubs, etc. 
Informal financial operators, for example, friends, relatives, traders, etc.). 
We now focus on each of these intermediaries 
(i) NGOs 
These groups have sprang up to fill in the gaps left by formal institutions in providing credit 
and savings facilities to the rural as well as low income urban communities. Among some of 
these grassroots institutions are the: Uganda Women Finance and Credit Trust (UWFCT), 
Centenary Rural Development Bank (CERUDEB), ACORD, Foundation for International 
Community Assistance (FINCA), World Vision and other Church-related NGOs. 
Traditionally, NGOs have played the role of advisers and extension service-providers to 
groups engaged in savings and credit activities. 
Of recent, some NGOs have further expanded their activities in microcredits. Through the 
creation of solidarity groups of borrowers, the NGOs can hedge risks stemming from lending. 
Savings, although not a primary concern at the beginning, are now also collected by some of these 
NGOs. 
From a local perspective, however, isolation is still the main problem faced by 
credit-specialized NGOs. NGOs operating as 'banks' are not banks (that is, they are not part of 
the financial system; they can have no direct financial exchange with neigbhouring banks or even 
among themselves). They are placed in a situation common to all economic agents: they need to 
go through banks to deposit their funds or transfer them to other institutions. When they collect 
deposits, NGOs issue liabilities that are not guaranteed by the central bank. 
The two approaches in relation to the role of NGOs in microcredit deserve some attention. 
The NGO role as advisers to borrowers can be looked at as a strategic aspect of the development 
of microcredit. It provides the linkage between groups retailing credit at the local level and the 
banking sector, from which the wholesale credit originates. In this relationship, NGOs are 
facilitators, not actors. Strengthening such a linkage would ensure that the entire process works 
in an integrated way and no part of the financial sector remains isolated. 
NGOs provide also provide some advice and training to their clients in the areas mainly of 
business practices and financial management. Project monitoring is also an important component 
of the training. 
The main constraint to these NGOs is the issue of sustainability. Many of them rely on donor 
funds and only clients of certain categories are served. 
The NGOs cannot generate much income from the members savings (for example, by lending 
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them out and charging market interest rates) as the law does not allow them to lend out such 
funds. NGOs may invest such funds in instruments like Treasury Bills at low returns and this 
situation hinders growth and encourages continued dependence on donor funding. 
(ii) Self-help groups 
Savings and credit cooperatives (SCCs) or societies raise savings from and make loans to 
members. Although they are membership organizations, sometimes raising money from shares 
as well as voluntary deposits, they are relatively large and open to new members, unlike 
ROSCAs. 
Owino Market Agency 
To join the scheme members must operate an account with minimum $9. Each 
memeber is required to save $2 per week. The members are organized in 
groups of Jive people (Core group) who are engaged in incoe generating 
activities. Ten of the groups of five form what is called an Economic group (50 
members). Each group of JIve has a chairman and a secretary Out of the 
group of chairmen of the Core Groups an executive team comprising a 
Chairman, Secretaiy and Treasurer is elected. It is the Executive who oversee 
the administration of the loan advanced to members. Every member of a core 
group is asked to have a guarantor among the five who ensures that the money 
is paid back, or he takes up the debt himself 
In SCCs members save jointly toward common objectives such as school fees, annual 
festivals, or community development, sometimes making loans at high rates to increase 
accumulated amount. 
ROSCAs are membership groups in which all members pay in set amounts at regular intervals 
to a common pooi, which goes to each member in turn. Intermediation occurs between members 
whose turn comes earlier and later within a small, closed group over a fixed period of time. 
Mutual trust offsets the risk that early recipients will drop out. 
The main advantage of these intermediaries lies in their simplicity, informal nature, rural 
biased, easy accessibility to their clients and community participation in decision-making and 
management. 
(iii) Informal financial operators 
This category includes relatives, friends, neighbours, traders and professional money-lenders. 
Unlike financial transactions in the formal sector, transactions in the informal sector rarely 
involve legal documentation. Moneylenders cover a wide range of credit arrangements with 
interest rates ranging from 0 to as much as 100 percent per month. In general, the most common 
source of informal finance consists of relatives and friends. 
All the informal moneylender surveyed base their lending decisions on firsthand knowledge 
of the borrower. In our sample, there are very few what would be described as professional 
moneylenders. 
Informal lenders draw heavily on information obtained through personal, social and business 
relationships in order to preselect clients. Traders and landlords lend only to their customers and 
tenants. Most informal lenders do not use interest rates to discriminate among clients. Through 
pre-screening, all of the borrowers of each lender fall into similar risk category. 
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Informal lenders generally require security but are much more flexible than banks in accepting 
personal guarantees. arrangement with employers and movable properties. 
Informal enforcement is easier than going through the legal system. For example, a 
landlord-lender could make productive use of pledged farmland, whereas a bank would face a 
long, expensive legal process to seize it. Personal relationships and social pressure, either within 
membership groups or through family members, are often instrumental in ensuring repayment 
without aggressive enforcement measures. 
Traders are an important source of informal credit. They supply either inputs and equipment 
or cash advances to farmers, linked to purchase of produce at a highly discounted price. Such 
interlinked transactions reduce uncertainty. 
Collateral requirements vary from case to case, for example, a client may have to surrender 
a car, land title (with signed transfer forms for the land in favour of the money lender), etc. 
Types of agreement between lender and borrower: 
a) A formal agreement may be entered into between the lender and the borrower 
wiiieii IS eiijoiccaui LII LUUILS UI LctW. 
b) An informal agreement, verbal, and probably witnessed by a third party. 
Most of the borrowings arise out of desperation, making the agreement somehow lopsided 
in favour of the money lender. There is therefore need for reform in the legislation, for example, 
Money lender/borrowers Act to protect the interests of both. 
Relatives and friends also provide some form of micro-finances. Borrowing in the informal 
sector is usually mainly for consumption and has flexible collateral/security arrangements. Some 
of the loans from relatives and friends are at zero interest rates. 
6.3 Savings4 activities 
informal savings groups have been formed for various purposes. in urban and peri-urban areas, 
groups are formed for welfare purposes and perform functions like organizing weddings, funerals 
of social merry-making occasions (Christmas, Easter, Independence, etc.). Such groups have 
common bindings/interests, for example, the Ajono drinkers group which bring members together 
on a regular basis. Gradually such groups initially formed for social welfare purposes begin to 
wi den their operations to include development-oriented undertakings. 
However, one of the problems with these groups is that they are usually small and weak and 
built around a few individuals and are therefore susceptible to individual abuse and weaknesses. 
in rural areas, savings are in kind. An individual would count his wealth/savings in form of 
livestock, food granaries/stores, coffee trees (see also Obwona and Ssentamu-Ddumba, 1996). 
The development of group savings are also being enhanced by NGOs that seek to assist 
communities through credit and other financial services to groups rather than individual clients. 
However, a number of internal as well as institutional problems still greatly impede the 
formation and growth of informal savings mechanisms/groups in Uganda. They include: 
(a) Lack of recognition (by the law) and support from government and formal 
financial institutions. For example, the procedure of opening accounts with formal 
financial institutions is cumbersome and discourages savings groups from 
opening accounts with formal institutions like banks. 
4 
This refers to monetary savings-not savings in kind. 
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(b) Scattered holdings and poor infrastructure impede the formation of strong and 
larger savings groups while making it difficult to supervision. 
(c) Lack of exposure and training of group members. Some households are reluctant 
to give their financial savings to somebody else and are suspicious of the formal 
and tax authorities. 
(d) A weak legal framework that does not facilitate debt recovery and which can be 
manipulated by wilful defaulters. 
6.4 Evidence of financial market fragmentation 
Although we find it difficult to make precise comparisons for loans of widely different terms 
and conditions, financial flow from formal to informal markets are negligible. Informal financial 
agents generally have limited capital base and little access to borrowed funds. Even those 
moneylenders who can access bank credit through their other business activities rarely do so for 
the purpose of on-lending. The main sources of the expanding loanable funds by informal agents 
are mobilised savings and reinvested profits (mainly from other activities). 
We find no direct linkages between informal agents. Informal clients generally have neither 
a savings nor a credit relationship with formal banks, and a few caii obtain credit from more than 
one source. 
Interest rates vary widely across informal institutions, as well between formal and informal 
markets. Moneylenders' rates are generally higher than formal rates. 
Delinquency and default rates of informal lenders are generally low relative to banks. 
Loan administration costs (screening, monitoring, and contract enforcement) are generally 
lower as a percentage of loan amounts for informal lenders than banks. Most of the informal 
lenders' costs are in prescreening the client's ability to repay, not the particular use of funds, 
whereas banks devote considerable resources to project evaluation. The value of the time that 
moneylenders allocate to administer loans is less than 5% of loan amounts. 
Most of the informal financial units surveyed mohilise their own funds, usually at very low 
cost; they have no access to bank loans for on-lending. ROSCA members evidently have a low 
opportunity cost of funds, because they persist despite the absence of interest payments. The 
opportunitycost of funds for money lenders who are also traders is low because they generally 
lend out temporarily idle funds. 
The evidence indicates that financial markets in Uganda are highly fragmented. Formal and 
informal lenders are polarized at extreme ends of the market, with relatively little overlap of 
clientele. Each informal and formal institution selects a narrow range of clients and products. 
Although some informal agents link households and small businesses to the formal financial 
system through their deposit mobilisation activities, this is one-way link with virtually no linkage 
on the credit side. 
Informal interest rates are generally much higher than formal rates, yet informal lenders have 
both lower transaction costs and lower default rates. Among the informal lenders, the variation 
in rates is much wider than the variation in transaction costs and default rates. Informal lenders 
appear better able to enforce collateral than banks and to have a relatively low opportunity cost 
of funds. Hence the relatively high rates charged by informal moneylenders are likely to represent 
substantial monopoly power vis-a-vis borrowers who lack access either to formal credit or to 
membership-based informal finance. 
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The relatively low transaction costs and loan losses of informal agents is serving clients who 
lack access to formal banking system indicate that they provide a reasonably low-cost solution 
to the information and enforcement problems that characterise the Ugandan economy. 
6.5 Hindrances to linkages 
Based on our analysis of the local financial infrastructure, three categories of problems must 
be overcome in creating horizontal relationships among intermediaries at the micro level. 
(a) Cultural/ideological problem 
This problem is created by the fact that many intermediaries at the micro level work 
within a strong philosophical framework. This framework dictates the way in which the 
microtinance operations are perceived and how the intermediaries should conduct them 
(eg. in microcredit operations, savings should always come first, or lending should always 
come first, or lending and savings should always come together). Ideological perceptions -h --.h- ÷h + fh 11 L. j)LJWL4 I Ui JIi LiIL IL?CLU LU UL JIaLiUiL CUIIUIJb IIILLIiJJLU4I UL LII IULUI IL, V L,I 
(b) The logistic problem 
This relates to the exchange of physical cash between the intermediaries working in an 
area. A set of intermediaries is not an integrated network until all intermediaries can 
access a clearing mechanism that allows them to borrow and lend cash among 
themselves. This, in turn, necessitates the setting up of an information system that keeps 
each intermediary informed of the cash situation of the others. It also requires a physical 
means of transportation that helps the,intermediaries to exchange physical cash. 
(c) The institutional problem 
In determining how institutions can work together to overcome their differences in 
cultures and procedures, two issues need to be addressed: how to overcome the risk 
problem (each institution is not keen to work with the others) and how to look for 
complementarities as a basis for linking institutions together. 
(d) The risk problem 
Linkages among financial institutions are possible only when each institution trusts the 
other institutions and agrees to do business with it. In the case of financial institutions 
(banks, NGOs and groups), risk is the most critical problem that must be overcome to 
create trust. The network approach taken to build up the local financial infrastructure is 
likely to attach a critical and overwhelming importance to risk. 
An analysis of the constraints created by the links established between NGOs and banks will 
illustrate this issue. 
In an intermediary relationship between banks and non-banks, risk is present at two level: at 
the NGO level in the lending by the non-bank intermediary to microenterprises. and at the bank 
level in its refinancing of the operations of the non-bank intermediary. The two risks are clearly 
interrelated. The bank's risk depends on the financial health of the non-bank intermediary but also 
on the success (in terms of repayment) of the non-bank intermediary's own lending operations. 
Linkages are possible between a bank and non-bank intermediary only if the problems posed by 
these two risks are addressed simultaneously. 
When working in isolation, non-bank intermediaries have their own ways of addressing their 
own risk problem. They can extend character loans, (that is, they do cover risks through specific 
legal or financial measures) or they can address the risk issue through the formation of solidarity 
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groups (that is, through collective responsibility) or any other form of grouping. Character 
evaluation is based on a subjective judgement on the part of the lender. Solidarity among 
borrowers can be effective because the lender and the borrowers are bound by a link of 
confidence in one another. 
Both methods are viable if the lender operates in isolation from other institutions (that is, the 
lender operates with its own funds and lends them only to borrowers that it knows). The situation 
changes if, through the linkage, the non-bank intermediary seeks refinancing from a bank. In this 
case, it is likely that the bank will demand not only that its own risk in the lending to the 
non-bank intermediary be covered by the non-bank intermediary-owned tangible assets but also 
that the lending activity undertaken by the non-bank intermediary be secured in such way that it 
will not put the financial situation of the non-bank intermediary at risk. In other words, the bank 
will be interested in the way the non-bank intermediary handles its own risk. 
This constraint may cast a new light on the much-publicized merits of the solidarity groups 
in hedging the risks of microfinance intermediaries. Unless solidarity groups (and character loans) 
are considered as good hedges by banks, the non-bank intermediary is not likely to be allowed 
to borrow from banks. In practice, banks are not likely to accept solidarity groups or character 
loans as good hedges for the non-bank intermediary's own activities. Solidarity groups therefore 
remain acceptable as long as the non-bank intermediary is donor-dependent; they are likely to 
become less acceptable the day the non-bank intermediary wants to borrow from a bank. 
The network approach will change the way non-bank intermediaries handle their own risk 
problem, which will have to addressed through asset/equity building rather than simply through 
reliance on character or the creation of solidarity groups. This way of handling the risk issue will 
provide the intermediary with liquid reserves with which to repay the bank if it has a problem; 
it will be an acceptable hedge for the banks. The net result will be that the non-bank intermediary 
will establish some form of borrower-supported guarantee mechanism to cover its own risks. 
The network approach shows therefore that microfinance, despite its specificities, has not 
changed the fundamental rule of banking: capital (or reserves, or liquid assets) must be 
commensurate with the size of the lending activity. 
7.0 Discussions and policy considerations 
Financial sector reforms have focused on the formal sector. But our study shows that simply 
removing financially repressive policies is not sufficient to increase financial depth or to induce 
banks to reach a wider clientele. 
In contrast, informal financial agents have responded positively to demand from clients who 
continue to lack access to formal finance. Expansion of demand and supply in informal markets 
appears related more to growth of real sector than to changes in financial policies. 
Informal financial institutions used a variety of specialized methodologies to mitigate the 
problems caused by information asymmetries and to contain risks and transaction costs. In 
dealing with small clients, informal institutions used methods that enabled them to achieve 
relatively low transaction costs and default rates compared with what banks reported for both 
large and small clients. 
Formal financial deepening is a long-term process that also requires a sound macroeconomic 
environment, stronger regulatory and supervisory frameworks, improved information flows, and 
legal and judicial reforms to facilitate contract enforcement. Until costs to formal institutions of 
acquiring information and enforcing contracts are significantly reduced, informal financial 
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institutions will retain a comparative advantage in their market niches. 
The efficiency of financial system as a whole can be improved by enabling informal and 
emerging semiformal institutions to function and better integrate with the rest of the system. 
Forging direct links 
The study findings support the view that incentives and support for linkages among segments 
of the financial market may be needed to accelerate integration of formal and informal financial 
institutions. To expand financial market segments viewed as risky by banks, it is likely to be more 
effective to induce banks to link up with institutions that use appropriate methods than to expect 
banks to lend directly. 
Such institutions could help in formulating the projects, filling in the forms, negotiating on 
behalf of the borrower, supervising the projects and helping in making the investment a success. 
Alternatively, partial guarantee of a line of credit to an NGO or association of informal agents 
for on-lending in small amounts would make more sense than guaranteeing direct small loans by 
banks. 
Some form of flexible and supportive regulatory framework for semiformal intermediaries 
would help give formal institutions greater confidence in lending to them. Banks could provide 
a deposit instrument adapted for savings and credit societies. 
By this, FFIs may reduce their risk burden since they share this with IFIs and improve the 
management of credits (the credit bureaulmoney lender possesses superior knowledge of clients). 
Contract enforcement 
Improving contract enforcement through reform of the legal system is a fundamental long-term 
institutional measure that would encourage formal institutions to serve dynamic small-scale 
enterprises. This may require introducing special commercial laws and courts. Measures to 
facilitate the seizure of equipment and stock in case of default, would encourage leasing and 
working capital loans to smaller businesses. 
Information and managing risks 
Difficulties in obtaining reliable information and in managing risks cause fragmentation by 
raising the costs to formal institutions of entering household and small-scale enterprise market 
segments. These difficulties enable informal agents, who have developed individualized 
information and social networks, to form local monopolies. Measures to improve the flow of 
information about borrowers include establishing 'bureaus de risques' or credit rating agencies, 
creating registries for recording secured debt, and making audits available to small businesses at 
reasonable cost. 
Central Bank 
A conspicuous deficiency in Uganda, as in other developing regions, is the lack of a central 
institutional agency to oversee and promote semi-formal finance and to foster viable linkages 
with the formal sector. The situation is acurious amalgam of benign neglect, hostility and 
prejudice because informal finance is associated (mistakenly) with the illegal or underground 
economy which therefore is regarded as being beyond the legitimate purview of the regulatory 
authorities. 
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It is imperative that Bank of Uganda accord high priority to the creation of properly-designed 
and staffed special units to research, monitor, promote and refinance the semi-formal financial 
sector. But it is equally, if not more, important for Bank of Uganda to adopt a positive attitude 
and constructive policy approach towards semi-formal finance with a view to formulating and 
facilitating the operations and transactions within the sector as much as fostering market-oriented 
linkages with the formal sector based on an intermediate financial technology within an 
appropriate legal framework on, for example, the following lines: 
• promotion of group borrowing and lending units for commercial banks; 
• creation of a panel of guarantee brokers to appraise and guarantee bank credit to 
ROSCAs ; and 
• offer of market-oriented rediscount and refinance facilities through the Central 
bank for promissory notes or other credit paper originating from semi-formal 
financial sector which could be subject to a guarantee by commercial banks, 
authorised brokers or responsible guarantors. 
Finally, the strengthening of all the sections of the Bank responsible for the real sector, rural 
finance and microfinance should continue to enhance Government's efforts to deal a final blow 
to poverty (Kikonyogo, 1997: Smith, 1997). 
In conclusion, the study indicates that liberalization of financially repressive policies has 
limited impact on financial deepening without complementary measures to address problems of 
information, risk management and contract enforcement. Innovative methodologies of informal 
and semiformal institutions, however, are overcoming these barriers to small financial 
transactions. Including these methodologies in financial development strategies offers important 
potential to improve financial intermediation and widen access to financial services in Uganda. 
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Appendix 1 Survey results 
Table 1A: Do you usually borrow money? 
BORROW FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
YES 262 52.6% 
NO 236 47.4% 
TOTAL 498 100.0% 
Table 2A: Sources of borrowing money by sex 
SEX 
J_INDIVIDUAL 
SCA NGOS BANKS OTHERS 
MALE 67 (68.4%) 59(61.5%) 33 (73.3%) 27 (90.0%) 20(87.0%) 
FEMALE 31(31.6%) 37 (38.5%) 12(26.7%) 3 (10.0%) 3 (13.0%) 
TOTAL 98(100.0%) 96 (100.0%) 45 (100.0%) 30(100.0%) 23(100.0%) 
Table 3A: Marital status by source of borrowing 
MARITAL 
sTATus 
INDIVIDUAL SCA NGOS BANKS OTHERS 
SINGLE 18 (18.4%) 17 (17.7%) 6 (13.3%) — 3 (10.3%) 3 (9.5%) 
MARRIED 71 (72.4%) 69 (71.9%) 30(66.7%) 26 (86.2%) 20 (90.5%) 
WIDOWED 5 (5.1%) 3 (3.1%) 7 (15.6%) 1(3.4%) 0 (0.0%) 
OTHERS 4 (4.1%) 7 (7.3%) 2 (4.4%) 0(0.0%) 0(0.0%) 
TOTAL 98 (100.0%) 96(100.0%) 45 (100.07) 30 (100.0%) 23 (100.0%) 
Table 4A: L evel of education of household head by source of borrowing 
EDUCATION INDIVIDUAL SCA NGOS BANKS OTHERS 
NO 
EDUCATION 
3 (3.1%) 3 (3.1%) 2 (4.4%) 1(3.3%) 0 (0.0%) 
PRIMARY 14 (14.3%) 21 (21.9%) 3 (6.7%) 6 (20.0%) 5 (21.7%) 
SECONDARY 39 (39.8%) 22 (22.9%) 11(24.4%) 4 (13.3%) 5 (21.7%) 
HIGH 
SCHOOL 
10 (10.2%) 10 (10.4%) 7 (15.6%) 4 (13.3%) 3 (13.0%) 
UNIVERSITY 12 (12.2%) 10(10.4%) 9 (20.0%) 8 (26.7%) 2 (8.7%) 
OTHERS 20(20.4%) 30 (31.3%) 13 (28.9%) 7 (23.3%) 8 (34.8%) 
TOTAL 98 (100.0%) 96 (100.0%) 45 (100.0%) 30 (100.0%) 23 (100.0%) 
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Table 5A: Employment status by source of borrowing 
EMPLOYMENT INDIVIDUAL SCA NGOS BANKS OTHERS 
SELF-EMPLOYED 56(57.1%) 62 (66.0%) 22(48.9%) 19(63.3%) 9(39.1%) 
EMPLOYED- BY 
OTHERS 
42(42.9%) 32(34.0%) 23 (51.1%) 11(36.7%) 14(60.9%) 
TOTAL 98(100.0%) 96(100.0%) 45(100.0%) 30(100.0%) 23(100.0%) 
Table 6A: Age group by source of borrowing 











































































Table 7A: Religion by source of borrowing 










































Table 8A Type of sole proprietor borrowed from 
Table 9A: Frequency of borrowing from sole proprietors5 
NUMBER OF TIMES NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
1-3 33 33.7 
4-5 25 25.5 
6+ 7 7.1 
NON RESPONSE 33 33.7 
TOTAL 98 100.0 
Table IOA: Purpose of borrowing from the sole pro rietors5: 
PURPOSE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
EDUCATION 12 12.2 
EDUCATION AND SICKNESS 3 3.1 
BUSINESS[IN VESTMENT 59 60.2 
BUY LAND 1 1.0 
PAY DEBT. 2 2.0 
FAMILY 22 22.4 
OTFIERS 3 3.1 
TOTAL 102 104.0 
5 
Respondents were allowed to give more than one purpose 
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TYPE NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
COMMERCIAL MONEY LENDER 6 6.1 
FRIENDS, FAMILY, AND NON 
COMMERCIAL LENDER 
94 95.9 
OTHERS 5 5.1 
TOTAL 98 100.0 
Table 11 A: Terms of borrowing from sole proprietors6 
TERM OF BORROWING NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
NO TERMS 63 64.3 
PAY INTEREST 37 37.8 
TOTAL 100 102.1 
Table 12A: Type of savings and credit associations7 
TYPE OF ASSOCIATION NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
ROSCAS 71 74.0 
SCAS 18 19.0 
LICENSED COOPERATIVES AND UNIONS 6 6.0 
OTHERS 2 2.1 
OTHERS 97 101.1 
Table 13A: Nature of common bond for savin gs and credit associations 
COMMON BOND NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
COMMUNITY 51 
OCCUPATIONS 28 29.1 
ETHNICITY 1 1.0 
GENDER 12 12.5 
RELIGION 3 3.1 
OTHERS 1 1.0 
TOTAL 96 100.0 
Table 14A: Does the NGO you borrow from require collateral? 
COLLATERAL NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
YES 20 44.4 
NO 25 55.6 
TOTAL 45 100.0 
6 
Responses exceed 100% because some respondents borrow from more than one sole proprietor and each 
sole proprietor has his/her own terms of lending. 
7 
Responses exceed 100% because some respondents belong to more than one association or group. 
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Table 15A: What kind of collateral does the NGO reciuire?8 
KIND OF COLLATERAL NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
LAND TITLES 4 20.0 
ASSETS 12 60 
OTHERS 9 45 
TOTAL 25 125 
Table 16A: Interest rates charged by NGOs9 
INTEREST RATE(%) NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
<=10 13 28.9 
11-20 9 20.0 
>20 6 . 17.8 
Table 17A: Interest rates charged by banks1° 
iNTEREST RATE(%) NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
0-10 2 6.7 
11-20 5 16.7 
21-30 18 60.0 
31+ 1 3.3 
NO RESPONSE 4 13.4 
Table 18A: Are you a money lender? 
LEND NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
YES 93 18.7 
NO 405 81.3 
TOTAL 498 100.0 
8 
The total percentage exceeds 100% because some NGOS require more than one form of collateral security. 
The base used in this table is 20 because 20 Out of the 45 respondents who borrow from NGOS reported 
that NGOS require collateral security. 
9 
The base used in this table is 45 since only 45 of the 498 respondents interviewed borrow from NGOS. 
10 
The base use in this table is 30 since only 30 Of the 498 respondents interviewed borrow from banks. 
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Table 19A: Source of funds you lend 
SOURCE OF FUNDS NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
SALARY 40 43.0 
TRADE 48 51.6 
FARMING 21 22.6 
OTHER 5 5.4 
Table 20A : Did you honour all the loan requests last year? 
HONOURED NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
YES 37 39.8 
NO 56 60.2 
TOTAL 93 100.0 
Table 2lA: Amount of annual net inconie coming fi om loans 
AMOUNT NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
ALL 6 6.5 
MORE THAN HALF 5 5.4 
HALF 26 28.0 
LESS THAN HALF 38 40.9 
NO RESPONSE 18 19,4 
Table 22A: Collateral asked for by the money lende 's________________________ 
SECURITY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
POST DATED CHEQUES 6 6.5 
REAL ESTATE 5 5.4 
PROPERTY 26 28.0 
OTHERS 38 40.9 
NO RESPONSE 18 19.4 
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Table 23A: Penalties imposed by money lenders on debtors who default'1 
The base used in this table is 93 since only 93 of the 498 respondents interviewed are money lenders. The 
total of the percentage of the various penalties imposed by the money lenders may exceed 100% since 
some money lenders may impose more than one penalty on a single defaulter or have ever imposed several 
different penalties on different defaulters. 
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PENALTY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
RESCHEDULE THE DEBTS 8 &6 
STOP LENDING IHMIHER 35 37.6 
TAKE THE BORROWER TO POLICE 7 7.5 
SEIZE THE PROPERTY OF THE DEBTOR 24 25.8 
NO PENALTY 17 18.3 
OTHERS 13 14.0 
Appendix B 
Table 1B: Possible linkage matrix of local financial infrastructure institutions 
Recipient NGOs Banks Group 
Provider 
NGOs Allow Assist banks 
liquidity to to collect 
circulate deposits; 







Groups Provide Provide Allow 
hedging hedging for liquidity 
mechanism bank lending; to 
for NGO collect saving circulate 
lending for banks within 
liquidity LFI 
Note: LFI stands for local financial infrastructure 
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Table 2B: Some key micro finance programmes in Uganda, 1996 
Name Average Repayment Percent Savings Years 
loan size rate of women required in Uganda 
UWFCT $500-3000 60-80% 100% Yes 12 
FINCA $168 97% 99% Yes 4 
CRS $630/group 40-60% 60% Yes 10 
WVision $100 N/A 11 
FChildren 45% 99% 5 
CERUDEB 50%:<$1000 
50%:>$1000 -- 28% Yes 13 
UGAFODE $370 96% 80% -- 2 
PCSs $920 N/A 36+ 
PAP $2.7m 77% Yes 2 
Sources: NGOs 
Key: 
UWFCT Uganda Women Finance and Credit Trust 
CRS Catholic Relief Services 
WVision World Vision 
FChildren Feed the Children 
CERTJDEB Centenary Rural Development Bank 
PCS Primary Cooperative Societies 
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Appendix C 
Some responses from interviewees 
WHY DO YOU BORROW FROM THE SOLE PROPRIETOR INSTEAD OF THE 
FORMAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS? 
1. I needed a soft loan on no interest to start a business. 
2. I did not have any bank account. 
3. No interest, simple procedure, cheap compared to bureaucracy of banks. 
4. I borrow when I am in acute need and there is no time to think of financial institutions. 
5. Bank procedures are too long. 
6. Interest rates charged by banks are too high yet the amount of money to be borrowed is 
7r7 lC.'U1 
7. Financial institutions are headed by corrupt people and since I did not know anybody, it 
would be difficult for me. 
8. I do not see why I should follow all those bureaucracies in financial institutions yet there 
are other alternatives. 
9. Procedures of securing a loan are tiresome and the loans attract higher interest rates. 
10. Did not know that banks can give credit. 
11. Banks ask for security. 
12. Banks charge interest. 
13. No formal contacts with banks. 
14. Easy to approach, repayment period is flexible. 
15. Family relationship/lender flexibility 
16. Amount to be borrowed and time of payment is negotiable. 
17. Since the amount to be borrowed is small, the chances of getting the loans are high. 
18. They can't lend you when your account is in the red. 
19. I had no security. 
20. It was still initial stage with a lot of risks so I could not risk with Bank money. 
21. The whole process of borrowing money from the bank can cost you half of the total loan 
being sought. 
23, The money needed was too small that going to the bank was not worth it. 
24. Did not think of formal financial institutions. 
25. Bank loans are expensive. 
26. They are far (banks). 
27. Since I do not put money in the banks, I can not approach them. 
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28. I fear bank loans. 
29. It needs wealthy people. 
30. No interest is charged. 
31. His my neighbour (we know each other well). 
32. I borrow small amounts of money. 
33. I do not have security 
34. He is readily available and it is easy to negotiate with him. 
35. Borrowing at short notice is possible 
36. He is my relative. 
37. I tried the bank and it turned me down. 
38. There were no rough conditions associated. 
39. For safe custody. 
40. No travelling required. 
FOR WHAT PURPOSE DID YOU BORROW MONEY FROM THE SCA? 
1. To buy a cow and start grazing. 
2. To boost my business. 
3. Setting up a business, a kiosk. 
4. Rearing poetry. 
5. General up keep. 
6. Buy clothes for sale. 
7. For hospital costs and for business. 
8. To go to my distant home. 
9. School fees and other family needs. 
10. Trade. 
11. To pay bride wealth (dowry). 
12. To buy a plot of land. 
13. Building. 
14. Farming and petty trade. 
15. To buy food for my stall. 
16. To put rental houses. 
17. To finish my house. 
18. To buy a vehicle. 
19. To buy more land. 
20. To clear my land. 
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21. Ploughing, weeding, buying fertilizer for my plantations. 
22. To assist me in buying furniture, stationery and hiring for my nursery school. 
23. To pay rent. 
24. Medical care and dairy meal purchase. 
25. To improve banana plantation. 
26. For horticulture. 
27. To improve the welfare of orphans. 
28. To start a piggery project. 
WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF DEALING WITH 




2. Profits from shares 
3. No need for collateral 
4. Simple and easy procedure. 
5. Provide some advice on how to use the loan which is essential. 
6. Referees not required. 
7. The interest rates are low. 
8. NGO's do not segregate 
9. Monitors are employed by NGO 
10. It is a christian organisation which makes no profits but only to render services to the 
poor and hence does not charge any interest. 
11. NGOs go deep in the villages compared to formal financial institutions. 
DISADVANTAGES: 
1. Guarantors can betray you. 
2. Difficult to form groups because we need to look for trustworthy friends. 
3. Failure to pay by one member affects the performance of the rest since the rest has to pay 
for that one who fails. 
4. They are strict on paying back the interest and the principal borrowed. 
5, The amount of credit offered is limited. 
6. Very short grace period. 
7. Give less amount than requested. 
8. NGOs prefer lending money to groups 
9. Conflict and misunderstandings among members. 
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WHAT IS THE GOAL OF YOUR SCA? 
1. To create a revolving fund from which members can borrow whenever the need arises. 
2. It finances women activities. 
3. Development of the area. 
4. Poverty alleviation among its members. 
5. To mobilise savings and lend to each other. 
6. Saving and borrowing. 
7. To uplift the standard of women and their families. 
8. Improve welfare of teachers. 
9. Financing women projects. 
10. To help one another. 
11. To promote rural development. 
12. To bring services nearer to the people. 
13. To uplift the standard of widows. 
14. To help orphans. 
WHY DO YOU PREFER BORROWING FROM THE FORMAL FINANCiAL 
INSTITUTION INSTEAD OF OTHER SOURCES, EG INFORMAL LENDERS? 
1. To buy a vehicle (bus). 
2. Business (spare parts). 
3. To import spare parts of vehicles for sale. 
4. Importation. 
5. Expand my business. 
6. To raise zero grazing cows. 
7. Building a workshop, buying machines. 
8. Putting up a commercial farm. 
9. Small scale industry (rice huller). 
10. Agricultural production. 
11. To improve the standards of animal keeping. 
12. Put up a milling machine. 
13. Use it to pay workers. 
14. The amount to be borrowed out be given by informal lenders. 
15. They can lend large sums of money at once. 
16. I was not aware of other sources apart from the bank which would raise all that much 
money. 
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17. The bank is reliable. 
18. Informal lenders are not easily accessed. 
19. Sometimes I borrow big amounts of money which informal lenders cannot raise. 
20. To have cash at the time you need it. 
21. Their interest rate is fairer. 
22. I need money for long periods. 
23. If you are a good customer they keep on lending you. 
24. They provide business information or advise freely. 
25. They rectify the business proposal. 
26. They help you in marketing (showing markets). 
27. Period of repayment is long enough. ' j ,,,' 1.i:_ —--. - ""V -' 'J %JVJ)L, JJ'..I )L)1L ill L11¼. liii UI iijai lIIUJ1!g. 
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